governance as well as appropriate interplay between those institutions (Young, 2002 (Young, , 2008 . 1 In this article, we consider the institutional relationship between desertification science and desertification as a global governance challenge. In doing so, we focus on the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD).
Much like climate change, the problem of desertification is multifaceted. It is driven by a number of socioeconomic and environmental processes, resulting in a variety of impacts and biophysical manifestations, occurring simultaneously over a range of temporal and spatial scales. The international regime addressing desertification converges around the UNCCD, which comprises several formal institutions: the Conference of the Parties (COP) as its supreme governing body; subsidiary bodies such as the Committee on Science and Technology (CST), the Committee for the Review of the Implementation of the Convention (CRIC), and the global Mechanism (the UNCCD's resource mobilizing facility); a convention secretariat under the auspices of the United Nations; and a range of local, national, and international, scientific, nongovernmental, and community-based institutions. as such, institutions across levels from the local to the international are involved in both combating desertification and implementing the UNCCD. 2 as the UNCCD has slowly moved from institutionalization to implementation since the mid-1990s, it has faced a huge challenge in bringing together the various actors and institutions with a vested interest in its success. For example, the convention's detachment from the scientific community has received widespread condemnation, especially regarding the purpose and performance of the CST and the quality of the scientific advice it provides to Parties (Long Martello, 2004) . The alleged inadequacy of the science-politics interface in the UNCCD's institutional architecture has thus been the subject of much debate (grainger, 2009; Tal & Cohen, 2007; Toulmin, 2006) . Despite the dissatisfaction, explanations of why and how these shortcomings came about, along with consideration of their potential consequences, have remained rather elusive. Consequently, the science-policy interface of the UNCCD forms the focus of our analysis.
We first summarize the emergence of desertification in the international political arena and review the role of science in the evolution and institutionalization of the UNCCD. Second, we explore the effects of the institutional interface between science and politics and the impact this has had on the implementation of the convention at the international level. In particular, we identify the problems and pitfalls that ensued the institutionalization of scientific input, focusing on the first decade since the convention's entry into force in December 1996 up to its eighth COP in 2007. We suggest that the persisting "crisis narratives" of desertification and the convention's perceived lack of impact on the ground are not due to a lack of national and global scientific data on the issue per se (Leach & Mearns, 1996) . Rather, we argue, the communication of scientific research across and within groups in the desertification regime has been inadequate to support dialogue between the scientists and policy makers. We attribute this shortcoming to problems of institutional interplay. Third, we examine the decisions adopted at the eighth session of the COP held in 250 The Journal of environment & Development Madrid in September 2007 and the resulting "10-year strategic plan and framework to enhance the implementation of the Convention (2008 Convention ( -2018 ," assessing the extent to which institutional reforms to the CST seek to improve the interface between desertification science and policy. 3 We conclude that although the reforms proposed in the 10-year strategy represent a positive step and may go some way to ameliorate prevalent problems as they are gradually implemented, important challenges look likely to remain. Not least, this is because the proposed reforms evade the crucial root causes of the UNCCD's institutional shortcomings.
International Politics, the Role of Science, and the UNCCD
Desertification on the International Agenda
International political attention was first directed toward the problem of desertification by the Sudano-Sahelian drought and famine of the 1970s. This led the United Nations environment Programme (UNeP) to convene the 1977 United Nations Conference on Desertification (UNCOD). Through this meeting, UNeP aimed not only to expand scientific understanding of desertification and drought and their socioeconomic consequences but also to stimulate development and mitigate desertification in severely degraded dryland regions (Rhodes, 1991) . The global scientific community played a key role in preparations for UNCOD, synthesizing the available information on the definition, extent, and severity of desertification, arguably providing for one of the best scientifically prepared political conferences of the 1970s (McCormick, 1989) . Focus was placed on improving the assessment of desertification, furthering understanding of the processes and biophysical changes leading to desertification, identifying appropriate remedial actions to rehabilitate degraded land, and exploring the links between desertification and other dryland environmental problems (such as drought, climate change, and so on; Thomas, 1997) . The emerging Plan of action to Combat Desertification (PaCD) was thus the result of political discussions following direct scientific input. It provided the UNeP with a general mandate to organize and coordinate action with a view to eventually controlling desertification worldwide by the year 2000, as well as 28 specific recommendations on what needed to be done.
By the early 1990s, it was clear that the Plan of action was not meeting expectations. Desertification had been insufficiently prioritized within national development plans and legislation, whereas donor resources had failed to materialize. 4 Nevertheless, more tangible international efforts to address desertification ensued in the wake of the 1992 United Nations Conference on environment and Development (UNCeD). This was primarily due to the persistence of african states, which felt the developed world's interest in climate change and biodiversity issues distracted attention from the sustainable development challenges linking to desertification (including poverty, recurring drought, and food insecurity) faced, in particular, by africa (Corell, 2003; Najam, 2004) . In response to the african request and in conjunction with chapter 12 of agenda 21, in its 47th Session in 1992, the UN general assembly resolved to establish the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for the elaboration of an International Convention to Combat Desertification (INCD). Negotiations first convened in January 1993 and involved government representatives, international agencies, NgO representatives, and scientific experts. Five sessions later, the "United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification in Those Countries experiencing Serious Drought and/or Desertification, Particularly in africa" was adopted in Paris on June 17, 1994 (UNCCD, 2002 . It opened for signature on October 14-15, 1994 and finally entered into force on December 26, 1996. It has since gained the signature of 193 Parties-more than any comparable international environmental agreement, thereby virtually attaining universal membership ahead of any comparable international environmental agreement.
The final text of the UNCCD contains both traditional and innovative elements as far as international environmental agreements are concerned. Its major innovation is an emphasis on public participation and the inclusion of indigenous knowledge in actions to combat desertification and mitigate the effects of drought. 5 In particular, the UNCCD places explicit emphasis on the involvement of nongovernmental stakeholders, notably community-based organizations, in both decision making and implementation. This requires interaction between different stakeholders, levels, and scales, aiming to minimize the distance between those who formulate the rules and those who are subject to them (Olsson, Folke, & Berkes, 2004; Young, 2002) . The relative success of this endeavor has been reflected in a growing number of studies that scrutinize the influence of nonstate participants in the UNCCD process (Corell, 1999; Corell & Betsill, 2001; Knabe, 2006; Long Martello, 2004) . also related to the participatory innovation is the UNCCD's promotion of decentralization and the principle of subsidiarity, in terms of its implementation, the production of National action Programmes (NaPs), and the reporting process followed by its Parties (Pearce, 2006) . as a result, the UNCCD has carved a niche for itself at the interface of environment and development. It is often referred to as the sustainable development convention, distinguishing it from the plethora of other multilateral environmental agreements. Indeed, besides addressing problems pertaining to land, the UNCCD simultaneously seeks to address poverty (both a cause and consequence of dryland degradation) as highlighted in article 4 (UNCCD, 2002; Way, 2006) . Many Parties subsequently consider the UNCCD a development convention rather than an environmental treaty, stressing its primary objective as being to fight poverty. This dual emphasis reflects salient differences of opinion that protracted the negotiations of the convention between developing and developed countries as well as ongoing debates about the implementation of the agreement. For the same reason however, developed countries have been reluctant to acknowledge desertification as a global commons problem and to commit to substantive legal and financial obligations. although this caveat is hardly exclusive to the desertification issue, the future success of the UNCCD will arguably depend on the effective mediation of divergent perspectives on the environmentpoverty nexus and improved understanding of the interlinkages between development and the environment.
Science, Knowledge, and the UNCCD
Science is supposedly a transparent and broadly democratic activity. In theory, scientific knowledge can be obtained by anyone, regardless of their class, nationality, or political persuasion (Litfin, 2000) . In a similar vein, scientific inquiry is assumed to render the invisible visible and to extend the temporal horizons of both citizens and policy actors, thereby injecting an intergenerational time frame into policy discussions and serving as a basis for an evolving norm of intergenerational accountability (Litfin, 2000) . Scientific practice and its particular influence on policy making are much more complex than this, however, and have given rise to a critical metascholarship that challenges these notions. 6 Crucially, scientists and policy makers tend to engage in "ongoing and iterative interactions" (Clark et al., 2006, p. 9) . Inherent social practices are prone to affect the outcomes of both science and policy in a manner that coproduces knowledge rather than generating "objective" facts (gieryn, 1995; Jasanoff, 2004; Jasanoff & Wynne, 1998) . accordingly, whether an issue is pertinent to policy making "often has more to do with its perceived salience, legitimacy, and credibility than with the science that elucidates" it (Schroeder, King, & Tay, 2008, p. 262) .
In the UNCCD negotiations, where scientific advice was mainly provided by an International Panel of experts on Desertification (IPeD), the influence of science was relatively minor in shaping institutional outcomes. This provided a stark contrast to the prominence of science in the development of UNCOD's Plan of action to Combat Desertification. Corell and Betsill (2001) suggest that this was arguably because the intergovernmental negotiating committee was capitalizing on the knowledge input of nongovernmental organizations. Whereas the UNCCD text acknowledges the importance of science and technology, its negotiators deliberately referred to "knowledge" as a broader concept, not to privilege science but to allow space to be created to incorporate a wider range of cognitive resources (Long Martello, 2004) . also, negotiators drew so heavily on chapter 12 of agenda 21-"Managing Fragile ecosystems: Combating Desertification and Drought"-that there was little room for maneuver over issues such as defining desertification (grainger, 2009; UNCeD, 1992) . Scientists thus had limited opportunities to consider or question the salience, credibility, and legitimacy of the knowledge being used. according to elisabeth Corell's in-depth analysis of the negotiation process, there was even a deliberate move not to produce any new scientific knowledge during the negotiations because this was felt to undermine the "neutral" status of the international panel of experts (Corell, 1999) . Moreover, it was feared that too much autonomy for the panel in producing and communicating knowledge could destabilize the entire negotiation process.
David Thomas suggests that the scientific community was sidelined in media and policy circles throughout the negotiation process as a result of the world's failure to solve the desertification problem after the earlier, more scientifically informed UNCOD (Thomas, 1997) . Such scapegoating was possible for a number of reasons. First, science is rarely able to provide quick-fix solutions to urgent problems. Indeed, scientific inquiries typically operate over different temporal and spatial scales to political agendas and the institutions mandated to govern the issue in question. This presents a problem of fit, in which the ecosystem properties and institutions governing (and researching) it do not coincide (galaz, Olsson, Hahn, Folke, & Svedin, 2008; Young, 2003) . Second, science rarely provides simple solutions that can be easily transferred between biophysical and institutional contexts, thus presenting a problem of scale (Bulkeley, 2005; gupta, 2008; Young, 2002) . Third, scientific research tends to develop iteratively over time, and scientific findings are rarely definitive and final. When new theories and data call into question earlier findings, the value of scientific research as a whole is often doubted. In this respect, science evolves under conditions of uncertainty; it is not a unitary activity that is practiced with internal agreement and complicity (Beck, 1992; gieryn, 1995) . Finally, science may also be misappropriated. The selective use or interpretation of scientific data can be used politically to play up or play down certain statistics and scenarios; a problem that also plagues public policy debates on many environmental and technological issues (Boehmer-Christiansen, 1997; Demeritt, 2006; Jasanoff, 2004; Pettenger, 2007) . Indeed, policy decisions based on misinterpretations and distortions can severely damage the credibility of science, leaving scientists in a double bind. In addressing socioenvironmental problems, they must enter the political fray, but they are also expected to remain isolated from politics to preserve the legitimacy and perceived objectivity of their work (Haas, 2004; Litfin, 2000; Schroeder et al., 2008) .
For example, a map of desertification hazard presented to delegates at the 1977 UNCOD has repeatedly been used to show the occurrence of global desertification in spite of the fact that it illustrates desertification potential in its broadest sense, that is, the general extent of dryland environments (Thomas & Middleton, 1994) . given these kinds of problems, it is paramount for scientific information to be unambiguously communicated between different groups in the desertification regime and for scientific data to be viewed in context. Horizontal and vertical interplay between institutions is therefore vital in the development of appropriate policy decisions. 
Institutionalizing Scientific Input: Problems and Pitfalls
These issues are reflected in the resulting institutional architecture of the UNCCD, where scientific and technological input has remained negligible. Such expertise is predominantly channeled to the COP through its subsidiary body, the Committee on Science and Technology, and a Roster of Independent experts, as nominated by the Parties, following provisions in article 24 of the convention. Membership of the Roster of Independent experts is not confined to scientists but includes practitioners with experience in addressing desertification as nominated by their governments. Likewise, membership of the Committee on Science and Technology is multidisciplinary and, in principle, open to all Parties. although this permits inclusiveness, there are considerable trade-offs. The large and diverse membership of the CST renders it rather unwieldy: It leads to discontinuities in the representatives attending each meeting and triggers arbitrary debates rather than focused and meaningful exchanges on specific issues. Discussions are typically dominated by government representatives, many of whom lack the training or expertise to engage in substantive debates on the scientific underpinnings of desertification. For example, Parties have repeatedly requested scientific advice on the development of benchmarks and indicators-a concern that is essential to maintaining legitimacy, encouraging compliance, and monitoring progress toward effective implementation of the convention. However, adequate input on these issues has yet to transpire to the COP (grainger, 2009). In the past, committee sessions have typically been marred by procedural quarrels and politically skewed debates rather than facilitating substantive deliberations on the issues at stake. Hence, CST meetings often yielded low-profile, nonauthoritative outputs with little relevance for either the COP or the scientific community.
To date, the UNCCD process has lacked an efficient operational mechanism to process and channel practical and scientific expertise for political decision makers. Ultimately, this results in minimal ideational interplay and inhibits cross-institutional learning.
8 This is because the COP has failed to tap the information potentially available from the scientific community, which in turn has been unable to draw the attention of the Parties to the scientific aspects of the issues on their agenda. accordingly, there have been calls for the provision of independent scientific policy advisory services from outside the immediate UNCCD process, referring to the role of the Inter-governmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) vis-à-vis the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) as a promising model. a formal review by the United Nations' Joint Inspection Unit, commissioned by the UNCCD's sixth session of the COP in Havana in 2003, also acknowledged institutional failure in the UNCCD's science-policy interplay. 10 In particular, it criticized the organization of the CST's work, highlighting concerns with its administration and the scheduling of CST meetings back-to-back with the COP (Ortiz & Tang, 2005) . Convening for only 3 days per meeting in the typically politicized atmosphere of the COP allows little time for the CST's program of work to be satisfactorily addressed. Discussions tend to be rushed, and draft decisions tabled by the CST for the COP are often adopted without meaningful consideration by the delegates. This suggests that the CST's outputs are of limited importance to the Parties and that their adoption is merely a formality.
In addition to the CST and the Roster of Independent experts, Parties to the UNCCD may also appoint ad hoc panels to provide information and advice on specific issues, which in turn are selected from the Roster. This modus operandi was harshly criticized for reasons of ineffectiveness and led to the establishment of an additional body of scientific experts, the group of experts (goe), following decision 17 of the fifth session of the COP in 2001.
11 This functioned until 2007 and comprised 25 members who, once again, were selected from the Roster of Independent experts. as eligibility for the goe continued to be limited to those on the Roster, knowledge and knowledge production under the UNCCD continued to be politicized, even though the convention codifies innovative, decentralized approaches to combating desertification.
12 Consequently, the CST continued to be charged with inflexibility and ineffectiveness, poor-quality scientific deliberations and subsequent irrelevance to ongoing policy debates on desertification.
Some commentators have attributed some of these problems to a lack of multilateral funds for antidesertification projects and a dearth of desertification research and understanding of the phenomena (grainger, Stafford Smith, glenn, & Squires, 2000) . However, the Information Network Project (a joint UNCCD/UNeP activity) gathered, assembled into a database and provided basic information on institutions, organizations, and networks working on desertification-related issues. It concluded that globally more than 4,000 organizations (many of them scientific) were involved in efforts to combat desertification, some of which directly relate their activities to the implementation of the UNCCD. Despite such potential for independent scientific expertise to inform efforts to address the desertification issue, during the period 1996-2007, there remained several misalignments: differences between developed and developing country Parties' perceptions of the UNCCD as an environment or development convention; the supply of and demand for scientific knowledge; the necessity to concurrently understand and govern desertification at a number of different levels and scales in the context of limited channels for dialogue between scientific and political institutions; and misalignment of the resulting institutional architecture and the requirement for the UNCCD to be broadly democratic, embracing a broad community of scientific expertise. Institutional learning within the UNCCD's governance architecture was consequently flawed as a result of an ideational interplay issue. This has arguably inhibited effective implementation of the UNCCD, constraining communication and information flows both horizontally and vertically.
although the complex mechanisms of global environmental change are not fully understood, scientists broadly agree that there are substantive direct interlinkages between climate change, the loss of biological diversity, and desertification (Millennium ecosystem assessment, 2005a (Millennium ecosystem assessment, , 2005b . at the time of UNCeD, however, the inherent complexity of the respective issues as well as the political and institutional dynamics of the emergent global environmental governance architecture called for three separately focused conventions. Nevertheless, issue linkages and conflicting objectives soon became visible, as each convention moved toward implementation. There have since been recurrent calls by the conferences of the Parties of all three Rio Conventions to capitalize on potential synergies in the implementation of their respective provisions. 13 However, the ideational interplay challenges mentioned above have meant that the synergistic potential between these agreements is largely untapped, and to date, those joint initiatives that have occurred have relied primarily on horizontal efforts at the international level. For example, a Joint Liaison group (JLg) was established in 2001 to share information between the secretariats of the three Rio conventions. In 2004, the JLg prepared a paper on options for enhanced cooperation among the three Rio Conventions, which set out some of the more pertinent cross-cutting issues. although the paper was presented to Parties to the UNFCCC in December 2004, it was not endorsed and has not since been reconsidered. explanation for this reluctance may lie in the poor institutional interface between politics and science in the desertification regime.
at face value, the UNCCD's CST operates just like comparable subsidiary bodies of other multilateral environmental agreements that have been established to keep decision makers "abreast of the relevant current and emerging global scientific and technological issues" (Ndiang'ui & de Vanssay, 2006, p. 2) . It convenes on a regular basis and feeds the outcomes of its deliberations into the broader decision-making processes of the COP. However, unlike the CST, the UNFCCC's Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological advice (SBSTa) performs the role of a knowledge broker, acting as a clearing house to channel information provided by the wider climate change scientific community, including information from the IPCC. although the SBSTa may be no stranger to procedural sideshows and politicized debate either, this modus operandi has gradually developed a reputation as an institutional architecture through which credible, decentralized knowledge can facilitate progress in the global governance of climate change. In particular, it helps to guide Parties in the adoption of scientifically informed decisions to enhance implementation of the UNFCCC and its Kyoto Protocol (Oreskes, 2004) . The UNCCD's CST, however, has a reputation marred by its perceived lack of influence, relevance, and appropriateness (Long Martello, 2004) . The UNFCCC's reluctance to seek further cooperation between the Rio Conventions may therefore partly reflect concerns about the UNCCD's weak science base. In addition, Parties' concerns over the political conduct of the UNCCD secretariat may work as a disincentive to cooperate from the perspective of the UNFCCC secretariat, which is keenly guarding its impartiality (Bauer, Busch, & Siebenhüner, 2009) .
another reason for the lack of enthusiasm for cooperation between the Rio conventions pertains to the UNCCD's appearance as a development convention rather than as an environment agreement and the disciplinary differences between the respective scientists working on the two issues. The climate change community is largely dominated by climatologists, meteorologists, atmospheric and marine scientists, whereas the desertification science community comprises mainly foresters, ecologists, and soil and agricultural scientists. Despite recent efforts to include social sciences and economics more prominently within both UNCCD and UNFCCC processes, the broad perception of the UNCCD as a development agreement with a poverty reduction focus may obfuscate the mutual benefits to be gained through increased dialogue. although this may change as adaptation to climate change features more prominently on the UNFCCC's agenda, the current situation offers few incentives for the climate change community to seek increased engagement with desertification scientists and the UNCCD process.
The implications of this failure to cooperate are extensive and could result in incoherent and even contradictory policies, institutional duplication, and the creation of further barriers to sustainable development. For example, the UNFCCC's Kyoto Protocol calls for the promotion of sustainable forest management in managing carbon. However, activities enhancing carbon sinks can both complement and conflict with the goals of the other Rio conventions. Conflicts may arise if governments seek to achieve their Kyoto targets through the use of cost-effective afforestation projects that create biological monocultures that reduce biodiversity (Bäckstrand & Lövbrand, 2006; van asselt, gupta, & Biermann, 2005) . Depending on the previous use of land earmarked for afforestation projects, it could also enhance conditions for desertification to take place (Carvalho, Coelho, Ferreira, & Charlton, 2002) . Together, these examples demonstrate how important it is for an adequate science-policy interface to be developed for the UNCCD that is in touch with the wider scientific discourse on global environmental change. a further obstacle caused by the inadequate interface between science and policy to effective global governance of desertification and implementation of the UNCCD pertains to the UNCCD's emphasis on participation. Despite being a central tenet of the convention text, its normative participatory philosophy has not extended to involve the broader desertification science community. The goe, although arguably improved overall participation of scientists, also failed to bring all required disciplines aboard (grainger, 2009) .
engendering wide international scientific participation in the UNCCD process is important because desertification means different things in different countries, and different states and epistemic communities have expertise relating to different aspects of desertification (Bauer, 2007; Juntti & Wilson, 2005) . Some groups specialize in developing more technical means of monitoring desertification, for example, through remote sensing techniques; others focus on developing indicators for sustainability assessment or on understanding rural livelihoods in dryland environments and so on. Failure to provide an infrastructure for systematic input from a variety of different scientific disciplines, states, and regional-level scientific bodies leaves Parties with an arbitrarily confined knowledge base on which to base their policy decisions. This in turn, could help to explain why developed nations have been slow to meet their obligations to the UNCCD. Scientific knowledge is a powerful source of legitimacy for all sides in a policy debate. However, if scientific data cannot be shown to be endorsed by the scientific community, it increases uncertainty about the problem in political circles. For governments and other stakeholders to accept scientific knowledge as authoritative basis for decision making, it needs to integrate available evidence with policy-relevant opinions. Conversely, policy recommendations derived from scientific data that can be labeled uncertain are more easily taken advantage of by Parties aiming to protract or even obstruct the convention process.
Progress Ahead? UNCCD at the Crossroads after 10 years of mounting dissatisfaction, the UNCCD's eighth session of the COP, which convened in Madrid in September 2007, was widely hailed as an opportunity to give a new lease of life to the convention and to drive forward efforts to address some of its ongoing obstacles to success. In the context of elaborate reform proposals tabled by the United Nations' Joint Inspection Unit and an Intersessional Intergovernmental Working group (IIWg), as well as a change at the helm of the convention secretariat, the Madrid meeting was a critical juncture in a protracted international political process.
14 In spite of painstaking budgetary quarrels, which required an extraordinary session of the COP to resolve, Parties' immediate reactions to the decisions taken at COP-8 were positive (International Institute for Sustainable Development, 2007a Development, , 2007b . Notably, these include adoption of the 10-year strategic plan, the revision of national reporting requirements, and institutional reforms aiming to enhance, in particular, the work of the CST. 15 It is on the latter that we focus, as we consider the implications of the COP's decisions on the CST for the problems highlighted above. We explore the tangible changes we expect to follow from the implementation of these decisions and the extent to which these may improve institutional interplay regarding the UNCCD's science-policy interface.
To begin with, the COP decided to adjust the timetabling of the CST's schedule. Parties intend to shorten the committee meetings held in conjunction with the sessions of the COP in favor of an additional intersessional meeting convening back-toback with the Committee for the Review of the Implementation of the Convention (CRIC). On one hand, this may yield an important step forward by improving the regularity of scientific advice for political discussion. However, there remains the risk of replicating the problems encountered in the earlier modus operandi, in which CST meetings were seen as a stage for procedural quarrels.
Useful lessons that could assist the UNCCD in avoiding some of the remaining pitfalls may be gained from the experiences of the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD). The CBD's Subsidiary Body on Scientific, Technical and Technological advice (SBSTTa) convenes for at least 1 week in the run-up to the CBD's COP sessions, affording Parties the opportunity to digest recommendations coming out of the SBSTTa in between meetings (Le Prestre, 2002). Moreover, its multiyear thematic program is based on the COP agenda to match the SBSTTa's work with Parties' explicit needs (Wagner, 2006) . This organization of work allows for a healthy measure of responsiveness in the subsidiary body and reflects the significance Parties attribute to its input for the overall regime process. Hence, the CBD's SBSTTa is seen to shape substantial policy content of COP decisions rather than being a mere formality. although not all recommendations coming out of the SBSTTa necessarily materialize as binding COP decisions, SBSTTa deliberations have been characterized by high political stakes, even being considered a "mini-COP" by many delegates and observers.
In contrast, the CST's program of work and the agenda of the UNCCD COP have typically pursued different thematic priorities and lines of inquiry. The case of the CBD suggests, however, that UNCCD decision making could benefit more from CST input, if the COP was to seek recommendations from the CST that explicitly address questions previously identified by the COP. accordingly, the UNCCD schedule would need to be adjusted to allow for substantive CST recommendations to inform COP agenda items (Wagner, 2006) . a further organizational change to the operation of the UNCCD's CST is that the intergovernmental Bureau that governs the CST will come together "for at least one intersessional meeting" per year and is explicitly requested "to increase cooperation with other conventions and relevant scientific processes." 16 The implementation of the decision to hold intersessional meetings of the CST and the intention of the CST Bureau to follow up more closely on the output of the COP should, at minimum, provide the CST with more time and space for substantive deliberations, including dialogue between scientific experts and policy makers, as well as with those involved with the other Rio Conventions. This would differ from the past, when the CST was largely occupied with the administration of its own existence and was prone to abuse as a convenient forum for political quarrels from the COP.
In view of this, the above adjustments appear sensible and positive regarding the functioning of the CST. However, both the United Nations' Joint Inspection Unit and the IIWg had highlighted the problems associated with the back-to-back format, so it would have taken a great deal of recalcitrance for the COP to decide to maintain the status quo ante. Whether and how this will facilitate greater coherence and consistency in CST recommendations to the COP will depend on the ways in which further-reaching policy decisions pertaining to the committee's program of work will be implemented and the effectiveness of related changes regarding the inclusion of a wider range of scientific experts.
Notably, the COP agreed on a profound reform of the CST's conduct. In particular, it decided to reshape future committee meetings to incorporate "a scientific and technical conference-style format" with one explicit thematic focus for each session "relevant to the implementation of the 10-year strategic plan" as "determined in advance by the COP." 17 The realization of this fundamentally reorganized format is to be seconded by a pertinent "lead institution" (or consortium) stemming from the scientific realm, as well as include "non-governmental organizations and other civil society stakeholders." 18 This ambitious packaging is doubtless an achievement in view of the tenacious evolution of the UNCCD's institutions.
Yet, although it appears to address some of the key criticisms that have been levied at the CST, it needs to be interpreted with a degree of caution. It should be noted, for instance, that the reformed processes and institutions may be directed by the same type of stakeholders, if not necessarily the exact same people, that have been part and parcel of the dysfunctional manifestation of the UNCCD's sciencepolicy interface. For example, political delegates and policy makers will continue to dominate the Bureau in charge of the CST. although some of these have a scientific background, many are civil servants who are detached from the desertification research community, and, as a result, may be unaware of current debates in pertinent scholarship. Second, the Roster of Independent experts comprises a membership that hardly represents a comprehensive perspective on the multitude of issues associated with the fight against desertification. Thus far, socioeconomic aspects of desertification are neglected as the vast majority of experts on the roster hail from natural science backgrounds.
These points reveal several caveats of the institutional interface that were left untouched in Madrid and which will not easily be amended in the foreseeable future. It is difficult to envisage how the CST Bureau will provide adequate guidance and judge the relevance of scientific processes if its recruitment pool comprises mostly political functionaries. Time will tell whether inputs from the scientific-style conference can help to improve the flow of scientific information to the COP. even as the relative relevance of the Roster of Independent experts wanes, nominations of experts will essentially remain political as long as Parties are making them (as opposed to some sort of peer recruitment). The decision adopted in Madrid, to achieve a better representation "of all relevant disciplines" currently remains little more than an expression of good will, although the scientific consortium selected to organize the scientific-style conference has taken the need for multidisciplinary perspectives on board in the development of its working groups. 19 Similarly, although in the COP-8 decisions it remains unspecified as to which NgOs and civil society stakeholders are deemed worthy of participation, how they will be selected, and how their involvement will be funded, the scientific consortium hosting the first scientificstyle conference has made considerable efforts to engage NgOs and civil society organizations in the preparatory process. Whether such inclusiveness is sustained in future scientific-style conferences will however largely depend on the nature and will of the consortium charged with their organization.
Despite efforts of the scientific consortium, Parties will likely underscore the primacy of political legitimacy, wanting to retain control over the CST not only on the input side but also in view of its output. although they may have little incentive to interfere with academic debates in desertification science, they are unlikely to relinquish their prerogative to filter scientific findings and to veto policy recommendations coming out of the CST. This, in turn, is bound up in the way scientific input was framed in the original negotiation of the agreement. More generally, it remains unclear how the new format will improve ideational interplay between scientific experts and political decision makers, leading to COP decisions that are both grounded in state-of-the-art scientific expertise and suitable for meaningful policy implementation. at worst, it may even create new problems by congesting the UNCCD's limited institutional capacities, which, in turn, would not help to harness synergistic potential between the Rio conventions. Not least, this is because it is unclear how cooperation with other conventions and scientific processes will take place and who will finance it, given the UNCCD's notoriously weak resource base.
Furthermore, the much sought consistency and coherence in the scientific input to the convention process may fall victim to the envisaged turnover of scientific lead institutions and specific priority themes after every session of the CST. This seems a risk worth taking to invigorate scientifically informed debate in the UNCCD process, but scientists too are no strangers to turf protection and politicking. Particular care will thus need to be taken to ensure that those playing a lead role in the scientificstyle conference recruit similarly flexible and open-minded experts to participate in the event to facilitate broader horizontal interplay between scientific institutions. Not least, it cannot be assumed that the Parties will make available the funds required for a revamped CST with additional meetings, even if research institutes and think tanks are buying in. Indeed, the history of the UNCCD does not bode well on this account and the run-up to the first CST organized in the new conference-style format indicates no change in this regard.
The litmus test for both the conference-style format and the emphasis on one specific priority theme per session will be the CST's next session, which convenes in concurrence with COP-9 in late 2009. It has been mandated by the COP to address "bio-physical and socio-economic monitoring and assessment of desertification and land degradation, to support decision-making in land and water management." 20 However, it remains unclear how this process will link the political formalities of the COP and CST to on-the-ground action. There is hence a risk that it may perpetuate the inadequate institutional interplay between science and policy, particularly across vertical dimensions.
Conclusion
Faced by complex interlinkages between environmental and development concerns, meaningful international responses to desertification require effective ideational interplay between scientists and policy makers. Here, we have discussed the relationship between scientific expertise on desertification and the political structure of the UNCCD. Focusing on the convention's Committee on Science and Technology, we have demonstrated that the institutional interface between science and policy has been problematic since the negotiation of the convention. This was attributed to several factors, including political disagreement over whether the UNCCD is an environment or development convention; a lack of scientific input in the negotiation of the convention text, leading to the development of poor channels for the flow of scientific information within and between institutional levels in the desertification regime; a narrow scientific knowledge base for the Parties to base policy decisions on due to predominantly political membership of the CST; and a mismatch between the supply of and demand for scientific information. We argued that these problems were exacerbated by low-profile, nonauthoritative outputs of CST meetings, leading to charges of inflexibility, ineffectiveness, and irrelevance to policy debates. Thus, the COP has historically failed to tap the scientific information available to inform efforts to combat desertification while the scientific community lacked an adequate channel through which it could draw Parties' attention to the scientific aspects of the UNCCD agenda. In turn, the synergistic potential between the three Rio Conventions has remained largely untapped, even as adaptation to climate change warrants increasing attention in dryland regions.
Noteworthy steps to address some of these issues were taken at the eighth session of the COP in Madrid in 2007. although our analysis of the Madrid decisions relating to the CST concludes that they have the potential to amount to much more than just "old wine in new bottles," we also argue that they do not fully resolve the fundamental issues of institutional interplay that plague the UNCCD. Our critique relates in particular to (a) the breadth of scientific input into convention processes, (b) the need for science to be provided by scientists rather than political representatives, and (c) the resulting lack of synergy in implementing the three Rio Conventions on climate change, biological diversity, and desertification. Nevertheless, amplified by results-based management and a sensible secretariat with a fresh leadership, the steps taken in Madrid could enhance the overall performance of the UNCCD and thus facilitate a more effective global governance of desertification. accordingly, this may (re)generate confidence in this key institution of global environmental governance, building political will and trust between Parties ahead of the 20th anniversary of the Rio summit. If this can be achieved, we may expect to see major progress against the baseline of the status quo. However, while the Madrid decisions address the symptoms of an ailing convention, they appear unlikely to remedy the causes of ineffective institutional interplay in the governance of desertification. 2. Following the Institutional Dimensions of global environmental Change (IDgeC) research program, we define institutions as clusters of rights, rules, and decision-making procedures that give rise to social practices, assign roles to actors participating in these practices, and guide interactions among these actors. In this context, interplay is understood as an analytical concept to scrutinize interactions between institutional arrangements that significantly influence institutional outcomes and impacts. Such interplay occurs when the operation of one set of institutional arrangements affects the outcomes of others; it can be horizontal or vertical, political or functional (Young, King, & Schroeder, 2008) .
